Recall from Monday’s reading and class discussion that Bradley Hooker thinks that a plausible approach to Rule Consequentialism (1) should endorse some kind of rule about preventing disasters/serious harms due to noncompliance, but (2) shouldn’t be too demanding (i.e., it shouldn’t require us to donate ALL of our discretionary income to effective charities, like Peter Singer’s act consequentialism demands of us). The reason why Hooker would reject a rule that says something like “donate all your discretionary income to charity when doing so is necessary to prevent disaster/serious harm due to non-compliance” is that he thinks there is a high “maintenance cost” of sustaining people’s commitment to that kind of rule and teaching it to the young. He thinks, due to human selfishness, this kind of rule could be successfully taught to and sustained in people only at great cost.
So, his argument looks something like this:
P1) Rules that have a high maintenance cost aren’t part of the optimific set.
P2) A super demanding rule about aiding those in need (e.g., donate all your discretionary income to charity when doing so is necessary to prevent disaster/serious harm due to non-compliance) has a high maintenance cost.
C) A super demanding rule about aiding those in need isn’t part of the optimific set.
In your discussion post, I would like you to do a few things (and you must answer all questions to receive any credit):
(1) Do you personally agree with P2 of Hooker’s argument? Why or why not? How might someone object to P2?
Attached Files (PDF/DOCX): Week 4 notes PHIL.pdf
Note: Content extraction from these files is restricted, please review them manually.

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